Financial markets can draw on a larger, more liquid, and more diversied pool of capital than the equity of reinsurance companies, yet they have failed to displace reinsurance as the primary risk-sharing vehicle for natural catastrophe risk. We show that such failure can be explained by dierences in information gathering incentives between nancial markets and reinsurance companies. Using a simple model of an insurance company that seeks to transfer a fraction of its risk exposure throughnancial markets or traditional reinsurance, we nd that the supply of information by informed traders in nancial markets may be excessive relative to its value for the insurance company, causing reinsurance to be preferred. Whether traditional reinsurance or nancial markets dominate depends on the information acquisition cost structure and on the degree of redundancy in the information produced. Limits on the ability of informed traders to take advantage of their information make the use of nancial markets more likely.
Although the rst reinsurance contract appeared in maritime shipping in Genoa in 1370, professional reinsurance companies did not emerge until 1842, with the founding of the Cologne Reinsurance Company following a catastrophic re in Hamburg in 1842. 1 For over a century, professional reinsurance companies have been the preferred vehicle used by insurance companies to shed part of their catastrophe risk exposure.
Recently, traditional catastrophe reinsuranceviewed as an institutional vehicle to transfer catastrophe riskhas come under scrutiny in the academic literature. In his study of the market for catastrophe risk, Froot (2001) shows that insurers should optimally reinsure against large catastrophic events rst. Moreover, since catastrophe risks are uncorrelated with aggregate nancial wealth, reinsurance premia should reect expected losses. Both of these conjectures are invalidated by his study of the aggregate prole of reinsurance purchases: insurers tend to reinsure medium-size losses, but retain (rather than reinsure) their large-event risks; the reinsurance premia they pay often are a multiple of expected losses. The author explains these phenomena mainly by the ineciencies that characterize the supply of capital to reinsurance companies and by these companies' excessive market power. According to Doherty (1997) , these ineciencies of the reinsurance market should spur the development of alternate forms of risk transfer, such as securities traded on nancial markets. Because nancial markets can draw on a larger, more liquid and more diversied pool of capital than the equity of reinsurance companies, they should have a strong advantage over reinsurance in nancing catastrophe risk (Durbin, 2001) .
The 1990s saw the development of a whole series of exchange-traded and over-thecounter catastrophe risk products. Catastrophe derivatives were rst introduced on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1992. These exchange-traded derivatives were based on underlying indexes that reected insurance property losses. They consisted primarily of futures and options written on futures contracts. Due to low interest, these contracts were replaced in 1995 by catastrophe spread options on loss indexes provided by the Property Claim Services (PCS); these options themselves were withdrawn in 2000. There was also low interest in the catastrophe index options traded on the Bermuda Commodities Ex-1 An overview of the history of the reinsurance industry can be found in Swiss Re (2002) . change, a dedicated exchange that opened in late 1997. Trading was suspended in August 1999, and the exchange eventually was liquidated. 2 Although o-exchange, privately placed catastrophe bonds, rst introduced in 1994 by Hannover Re, have been more successful, their share of the reinsurance market remains limited: at the end of 2004, these bonds' outstanding risk capital represented less than 10% of total insured losses (Sigma, 2006) .
Insurance, reinsurance, and other companies and institutions spend large amounts of money analyzing catastrophe risk. In this study, we show that dierences in information gathering incentives between nancial markets and reinsurance companies can explain why, over a decade after the introduction of the rst catastrophe instruments, nancial markets have not displaced reinsurancedespite the latter's alleged inecienciesas the primary risk-sharing vehicle for natural catastrophe risk. We consider a simple model where an insurance company seeks to transfer a fraction of its natural catastrophe risk exposure either through the nancial market or through traditional reinsurance, selecting the form of risk transfer that has the lowest cost. Better information about the exposure decreases the amount of capital that must be held by the insurance company, either for regulatory reasons or for risk management purposes. Information acquisitionwhether by the reinsurer or by informed traders in the nancial marketis costly, and the cost of the information produced ultimately is borne by the insurer. Building on the Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) model of the choice between private and public equity, we characterize the optimal information acquisition policy of informed traders and the reinsurer. We nd that the nancial market may display a Hirshleifer (1971) eect in the sense that the production of information by informed traders is excessive relative to its value for the insurance company. Not wishing to pay the cost of excessive information acquisition, the insurer favors reinsurance over the nancial market.
The preceding is predicated on the fact that agents can and do acquire information about catastrophe risk. Is this the case? RMS, one of three leading specialized catastrophe 2 A possible explanation is that market makers did not wish to make a market in which there was so little trading. Such explanation begs the obvious question of why there should have been so little trading in the rst place. The answer suggested by our analysis is that adverse selection on such markets is so severe as to make excessive any discount necessary to induce participation by liquidity traders. risk modeling rms, reports having over 400 clients among insurers, reinsurers, trading companies, and other nancial institutions. In a private communication, a member of the risk management department of Swiss Re, the world's largest reinsurance company, describes the relation between improvements in a given catastrophe's Loss Frequency Curve (LFC) and the number of additional employees analyzing the catastrophe, expressed as Full-Time Equivalents (FTE):
...10% improvement with one additional FTE after 12 months (deeper understanding of model and issues); next 5% with another 1.5 FTEs after another 15 months (research in specic areas); next 2.5% with another 2 FTEs after another 18 months (strengthening of overall risk management processes); last 2.5% with another 3 FTEs after another 24 months (optimizing the remaining details and handling increased complexity).
On a related note, Roll (1984) provides evidence consistent with futures traders' ability to forecastthat is, to acquire information aboutweather-related phenomena. 3 The argument we have made for catastrophe instruments can also be made for securities such as shares and numerous currency, interest-rate, and commodity derivatives.
Yet, such securities are traded on exchanges. What distinctive features of catastrophe risk makes excessive information acquisition a problem for catastrophe instruments but not for shares? We believe that the key dierences are the information acquisition cost structure and the degree of redundancy in the information produced.
Consider the information acquisition cost structure rst. Our model distinguishes between xed and variable information acquisition costs. Agents can acquire a signal of a given quality at a xed cost; they can rene the quality of the signal by incurring further, variable costs. We nd that the size of the xed cost and the relative magnitude of the xed and variable costsi.e., the degree of convexity in the information acquisition cost structureare key determinants of the preferred form of risk transfer. When the xed cost 3 The acquisition of information is clearly easier for some catastrophes than for others. Catastrophes dier in how likely they are to occur and in what damages would be if a catastrophe were in fact to occur.
For some catastrophes such as earthquakes, little can be known about the former; much can nonetheless be known about the latter. is large, information acquisition by multiple traders in the nancial market is too costly, and reinsurance is preferred. When the xed cost is large compared to the variable cost, centralized information acquisition by the reinsurer is more ecient than decentralized information acquisition in the nancial market, again favoring reinsurance. In contrast, when information acquisition costs are highly convex, information acquisition by several traders in the nancial market is more ecient, and the nancial market is preferred.
Thus, large xed information acquisition costs constitute a key explanation for the failure of exchange-traded catastrophe instruments. 4
The second key determinant of the preferred form of risk transfer is the degree of redundancy in the information produced. To motivate the concept of information redundancy, contrast two phenomena, one well-understood and the other much less so. An example of the former may be the protability of a rm; an example of the latter may be global warming. If it were possible to aggregate all available information about one and the other phenomena, for example through trading in a nancial market, it is likely that much less uncertainty would remain about the rst phenomenon than the second. The same holds true of nancial securities whose payos depend on these phenomena. More concretely, the value of a share traded on a stock market is likely to be estimated much more precisely than the value of a catastrophe instrument such as a catastrophe option traded on an option market. 5 This means that much more of the information about the option is redundant than about the share. Indeed, if the information were not redundant, gathering increasing amounts of information would progressively reduce and eventually 4 Fixed information acquisition costs for a given catastrophe are in the order of several million dollars (see Section 3). 5 This is consistent with shares having higher volatility than insurance-linked securities. To investigate the role of information redundancy in detail, we assume that the information regarding insured losses that a reinsurer or a trader in the nancial market can gather contains both a systematic and an idiosyncratic error component. We nd that the insurer's preference for one source of risk transfer over the other depends crucially on the relative importance of these two components. If the systematic error component is large, then having numerous traders in the nancial market produce information is not For example, if there are few liquidity traders in the market, informed traders are not able to camouage their trades. In contrast, reinsurance dominates when the standard deviation of losses is large. This is because informed traders perceive large prot opportunities, enter the nancial market in large numbers, and acquire large amounts of information. Since the cost of gathering information is borne by the insurer, the nancial market is more costly than reinsurance.
There is an extensive literature on the use of nancial markets for transferring catastrophe risk (D'Arcy and France, 1992; Niehaus and Mann, 1992) . Such literature has examined the advantages of nancial markets, emphasizing their risk disaggregation (Doherty and Schlesinger, 2002) and capital supply (Jaee and Russell, 1997) properties, and their lack of exposure to moral hazard and to default risk (Doherty, 1997, and Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2006) . In view of the very limited success of nancial markets in transferring catastrophe risk, a number of potential explanations have been investigated: transactions costs, basis risk, and behavioral factors. Froot (2001) rules out the rst. Harrington and Niehaus (1999) and Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (2004) nd that using standardized contracts carries little basis risk for large insurers. Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000) suggest that ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, and uncertainty avoidance may account for the reluctance of investment managers to invest in catastrophe bonds. Barrieu and Loubergé (2006) argue that the use of catastrophe bonds can be made more attractive by protecting bond buyers against the simultaneous occurrence of a catastrophe and a market crash. Unlike Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000) and Barrieu and Loubergé (2006) , whose explanations for the limited use of nancial markets are demand-based, ours is supply-based.
Insofar as it views reinsurance as an institution that serves to economize on information production costs, our paper is related to the extensive literature on nancial intermediaries as producers of information. 8 Our paper extends this literature by considering the role of two hitherto neglected factors: the information acquisition cost structure and the degree of redundancy in the information produced. As argued above, and as will be shown below, these are key determinants of the preferred form of risk transfer.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents our model of an insurer that seeks to transfer a fraction of the risks he has insured either through reinsurance or using the nancial market, selecting the form of risk transfer that has the lowest cost. Section 2 investigates the eect of information redundancy on the insurer's preferred risk transfer vehicle. Section 3 numerically analyzes the impact of the main model parameters on the insurer's decision. Sections 4 concludes.
The Model
We consider an insurer that has insured losses represented by an asset of an uncertain (negative) value. The insurer has to choose between ceding risk to the nancial market or to a reinsurer. 9 We assume that the insurer can cede no more than a fraction τ < 1 of the losses he has insured. 10
In order to motivate the ceding of risk, we assume that the insurer's access to information is limited and that he has higher net cost of capital than does the reinsurer. The insurer therefore cedes risk for two reasons. The rst is to replace his own, more expensive capital by the cheaper capital of the reinsurer or the free capital of the nancial market (the capital of the nancial market is free in the sense of having a net cost of zero).
The second reason is to induce the party to whom risk has been ceded, be it the informed traders in the nancial market or the reinsurer, to incur the cost of improving the quality of the information, either in order to prot from informed trading or in order to economize on costly capital. The information is communicated to the insurer either directly by the reinsurer or indirectly through the price in the nancial market. The insurer can then make use of this information in order to decrease the level of costly capital he himself must hold. The cost of the information produced is ultimately borne by the insurer, either directly through the reinsurance premium or indirectly through a discount on the price of 9 Although we consider the problem faced by a primary insurer for concreteness, the analysis is identical for a reinsurer choosing between retrocession and the nancial market, or for a rm choosing between insurance and the nancial market. 10 Moral hazard, adverse selection, and regulation generally preclude complete reinsurance.
the securities issued in the nancial market. The purpose of the discount is to compensate liquidity traders for the losses they will sustain to informed traders. Liquidity traders' losses equal the informed traders' gross prots. These in turn equal the cost of information production.
When selecting the form of risk transfer, the insurer therefore takes the dierence in the cost of capital of both options into account and trades o the quality of the information obtained (which results in lower required capital) against its cost.
The remainder of this section describes the details of the model. Section 1.1 describes the underlying information structure. Section 1.2 characterizes the structure of thenancial market and informed traders' optimal information gathering decision. Section 1.3 presents the reinsurer's optimal information gathering decision. Section 1.4 derives the insurer' expected payo for both risk transfer mechanisms.
The Information Structure
We assume that insured losses are represented by an asset that has value l+δ, with l < 0 and δ ∼ N (0, v δ ). Each agent s, which can be either a reinsurance company r or an informed trader n, n = 1, . . . , N , can acquire information i s = δ+ √ v s γξ + 1 − γ 2 s , 0 γ 1.
The error in the information about losses consists of two parts, one perfectly correlated across agents, ξ, and the other perfectly uncorrelated, s . Any level of correlation between the error terms of two agents can therefore be obtained by varying the parameter γ. Indeed, we have
We refer to γ as the degree of redundancy in the information acquired. To provide some justication for our choice of terminology, consider the average error term across N informed agents, 1 N N n=1
Using that variance as a proxy for the uncertainty that remains once the information across all agents has been aggregated, we see that the larger γ, the smaller the decrease in aggregate uncertainty as more agents contribute information, i.e., the larger γ, the larger the redundancy in the information across agents.
To provide some intuition for the role of γ in the model, consider the two extreme cases γ = 0 and γ = 1. In the former case, the variance of the average error term disappears for γ = 0 as N → ∞: there is no aggregate uncertainty when a large enough number of agents can be called upon to contribute their information. In the latter, the variance of the average error term is unaected by N : aggregate uncertainty remains regardless of the number of agents contributing information. We view the former case as representing well understood risks such as mortality risk (assuming new diseases such as AIDS do not render established mortality tables obsolete). Whilst no agent alone has a complete picture of the risk, all agents together do. We view the latter case as representing those risks that are still poorly understood, such as some forms of catastrophe risk. As mentioned in the introduction, there is evidence that the systematic error component in the estimates of losses associated with natural catastrophesthe redundancy in the informationis indeed large.
We allow v s to be chosen by agent s and assume that the agent's information acquisition cost consists of a xed and a variable component. By incurring a xed cost of k, agent s can acquire a signal with error variance v s = v, i.e., 1/v is the minimum precision of the information that can be acquired. The agent can then improve his understanding of the risk, i.e., rene the quality of his information by decreasing the variance of the error term to v s < v, at a variable cost c (v/v s − 1). The agent's total cost of acquiring information is therefore c (v/v s − 1) + k. 11 Note that information acquisition by agent s decreases the 11 As in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999; p. 1060) , and in the line of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , variance of the entire error term, reducing both correlated and uncorrelated errors, in the same proportion.
Note also that we assume that the reinsurer and informed traders can acquire the same information, at the same cost. In fact, given modeling expertise acquired and customer data accumulated over decades of operation, reinsurers may well be endowed with better information or have lower information acquisition costs than even sophisticated traders in nancial markets. However, since our purpose is to explain the dominance of reinsurance over the nancial market, we do not wish to build an advantage for reinsurance into the assumptions of the model.
The Financial Market
In this section, we describe the structure of the nancial market that we consider and investigate information acquisition if the insurer decides to transfer risk by issuing catastrophe instruments on the nancial market. 12 The structure we use closely follows Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , who generalize Kyle (1985) . In the primary market, all securities are purchased by liquidity traders. 13 The secondary market consists of N informed traders and of the liquidity traders who purchased the security in the primary market. The N informed traders base their demand on the information they acquire. The liquidity traders have demand z uncorrelated with all other variables, z ∼ N (0, v z ). Prices in the secondary market are set by a competitive risk-neutral market maker who expects to earn zero prot conditional on his information set. We are interested in determining the number of traders we assume that each agent acquires a single signal. This being said, the ability of each agent to improve the quality of his information by decreasing v s is equivalent to allowing him to obtain additional signals, each with variance v. In the special case where the error terms of the individual signals are independent, our formulation reduces to assuming that the rst signal costs k and each subsequent signal c. We choose the formulation c (v/v s − 1) + k for tractability. 12 Note that we do not consider the problem of optimally designing these securities. For an analysis of optimal security design, see for example Boot and Thakor (1993) , DeMarzo and Due (1999) , and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) . 13 We follow Holmström and Tirole (1993) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) in making this simplifying assumption.
that choose to become informed, N , the precision of the information they choose to acquire, 1/v, the information reected in the price, and the price at which the securities are issued in the primary market. As in Holmström and Tirole (1993) , this price is such that liquidity traders break even in expectation, accounting for the losses they expect to sustain to informed traders in the secondary market.
Recall that an informed trader n receives information
where δ is the uncertain amount of the loss. We conjecture an equilibrium in which trader n submits an order of the form x n = κ n i n and the market maker sets a price
denotes the total order ow received by the market maker, including liquidity trader demand z. Note that we consider a symmetric equilibrium, in which κ and v are the same for all traders.
Naturally, trader n takes the demand and the (inverse) quality of the information of the other traders as given when choosing his own demand x n and his (inverse) quality of information v n . Hence, in choosing x n , trader n solves
Solving for x n (the details are in the appendix), we have
where
In choosing v n , trader n uses x n obtained in (5) to solve
subject to the constraint 0 ≤ v n ≤ v. In so doing, trader n treats κ, ζ, and v as constant.
We show in the appendix that in a symmetric equilibrium (v n = v), we have
and that the rst-order condition for v is
Consider rst the price impact of order ow, ζ in (8). The larger liquidity trading variance, v z , the greater the importance of liquidity trader demand in order ow, and the lower therefore the price impact of order ow. The greater information redundancy, γ, the more intense the competition between informed traders, and the lesser therefore the price impact. The larger the number of informed traders, N , the more intense the competition between them; the larger also the pool of information in the order ow. The former eect decreases ζ; the latter increases it. Which eect dominates depends on N :
, the competition eect dominates and ζ decreases in N ; the opposite is true when N < N * . 14 The greater the variance of losses v δ , the more the market maker stands to lose, and the greater therefore the price impact of order ow. 15
This last eect is reected in the aggressiveness with which informed traders respond to information, κ in (9): foreseeing the large price impact of order ow, informed traders submit small orders when v δ is large. In contrast, informed traders respond more aggressively to information, the greater the camouage they are aorded by liquidity traders (large v z ), the lesser the competition between informed traders (small N ), and the higher the quality of their information (low v).
14 Note that N * decreases in γ: the more correlated traders' information, the smaller the number of traders required for the competition eect to dominate. 15 The eect of v on ζ is ambiguous, since
Now consider the rst-order condition (10). Greater liquidity trading variance, v z , increases information acquisition in the nancial market; as already noted, liquidity trading provides informed traders with the means to camouage the trades they carry out in order to prot from the information they acquire. Greater information redundancy, γ, also increases information acquisition. 16 To understand why, note that two properties of information make it valuable: its quality (low v), and its uniqueness (low γ). An informed trader responds to a decrease in the uniqueness of the information (higher γ) by increasing its quality (lower v) in an attempt to maintain its trading prots. A larger number of traders N reduces information acquisition because competition erodes trading prots. 17
Note also that since the left hand side of (10) tends to zero as N becomes large, no trader will incur the cost of improving the quality of his information beyond 1/v in a nancial market with a large number of informed traders: competition between traders drives the trader's expected prot to zero, thereby precluding him from recovering any cost he may have incurred and deterring him from incurring that cost in the rst place. Finally, the quality of the information acquired, 1/v, is increasing in the fraction of risk ceded, τ , and in the starting quality of the information, 1/v: more at stake induces more information acquisition; information acquisition is impeded by lower quality starting information. 18
As shown in the appendix, the expected prot of an informed trader is 16 To see this, note that
The impact of uncertainty about the loss v δ on the information acquired is ambiguous, since
As one would expect, this prot is increasing in the fraction of risk ceded, τ , in the variance of liquidity trader demand, v z , in the starting quality of information, 1/v, and in the uncertainty about the loss, v δ . 19 It is decreasing in the number of traders N , in the xed and variable costs of information acquisition, k and c, and in the degree of information redundancy, γ. This last eect arises becauseas is well-known from the auction literature (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) traders earn larger prots when the information available to them has a larger idiosyncratic error component. When γ is large, the idiosyncratic error component is small.
In equilibrium, the number of informed traders N active in the market is such that
Given the properties of Π f , the equilibrium number of traders is larger, the higher τ , v z and v δ , and the smaller v, c, k and γ. The information contained in the price at equilibrium is that contained in the total order ow Q, as P = τ l+ζQ. This information is
The securities are issued in the primary market at a discount to their expected value, τ l. The discount serves to compensate liquidity traders for the losses they expect to sustain to informed traders in the secondary market. The discount is endogenous and equals total information acquisition costs, N (c(v/v − 1) + k). 20 The issue price therefore equals
As l is negative, I < 0: liquidity traders are paid to bear a fraction τ of the losses. 19 We have
In this section, we investigate information acquisition if the insurer decides to transfer risk to the reinsurer. Let the reinsurer r have net cost of capital a r . Capital is needed by the reinsurer to maintain solvability in the face of greater than expected losses. We assume that for each unit of risk remaining (as measured by the standard deviation of losses after the reinsurer has acquired any additional information on the loss he deems desirable), the reinsurer requires λ units of capital. Thus, in an unregulated environment, a higher λ would reect more cautiousness on the part of the reinsurer, while in a regulated environment, it would reect more stringent capital requirements.
The reinsurer's capital has positive net cost because of information and incentive considerations (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Froot and O'Connell, 1997; Froot and Stein, 1998; Gron and Winton, 2001) . Note that, while capital is needed in the case of the nancial market too, where it takes the form of margin requirements, it has zero net cost in that case. Indeed, because it is deposited in a margin account maintained by a clearinghouse rather than invested in the shares issued by a reinsurance company, capital in the nancial market involves neither information nor incentive considerations. 21
As mentioned in Section 1.1, we assume that the reinsurer can acquire the same information as an informed trader, at the same cost. The problem solved by the reinsurer who is assumed to reinsure a fraction τ of insured losses l + δ is
where SD[·] denotes the standard deviation of losses after incorporating any information acquired, subject to the constraint 0 ≤ v r ≤ v. Note that the amount of capital needed, 21 The net cost of capital a r includes any discount at which the reinsurance company's shares are issued.
Any such discount is likely to be smaller than the discount on the catastrophe instruments considered in Section 1.2, because of diversication within the reinsurance company. This is the direct analogue to Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi's (1993) comparison of individual stocks and stock market indices. The cost a r can also be increased to include any economic rent the reinsurer may earn.
as represented by λ times the conditional standard deviation, is decreasing in the quality of the information acquired, 1/v r .
In the case of an interior solution, problem (14) has rst-order condition
Solving and imposing the constraint
Observe that more variable losses, v δ , induce more information acquisition by the reinsurer.
In contrast, since there is a single reinsurer, the degree of information redundancy γ has no impact on the reinsurer's optimal information acquisition strategy. Observe also that since ∂v r /∂φ ≥ 0, a greater net cost of capital, a r , and more stringent capital requirements, λ, induce more information acquisition by the reinsurer, as higher quality information serves to economize on costly capital. Finally, as in the case of the nancial market, the quality of the information acquired, 1/v r , is increasing in the fraction of risk ceded, τ , and in the starting quality of the information, 1/v.
It is instructive to compare v r in (16) with v in (10). It is possible to obtain both v r > v and v r < v. To obtain the former, increase v z and concurrently increase k to keep N constant. For v z large enough, there will be a v < v r . To obtain the latter, let k be so small and therefore N so large as to make v = v. For large a r , v r will be less than v and therefore less than v.
The Insurer
Having analyzed the information gathering incentives of informed traders in the nancial markets and of the reinsurer, we can now determine the expected cost to the insurer of using nancial markets or reinsurance to transfer risk.
From (13), the expected cost to the insurer of ceding a fraction τ of the losses to the nancial market is that fraction of the expected loss l plus the combined cost of information acquisition by informed traders, I = τ l − N (c (v/v − 1) + k). The benet is a reduction in the required amount of capital arising from the fact that the insurer only retains a fraction 1 − τ of the risk, and from the improved quality of the information. Hence, letting a i denote the insurer's cost of capital and assuming, as for the reinsurer, that the insurer must hold λ units of capital for each unit of risk remaining, the insurer's expected payo from using the nancial market for ceding risk is
where the second equality follows from (9) and (12), v is the solution to (10), and N is obtained from the zero prot condition Π f (N ) = 0. Note that the price is more informative (SD[δ|Q] is smaller), the larger the number of traders, N , the higher the quality of their information, 1/v, and the lower the degree of redundancy in the information produced, γ.
The variance of liquidity trader demand, v z , has no direct impact on price informativeness, but has an indirect eect through its impact on the equilibrium number of traders N and the quality of the information they acquire 1/v.
Similarly, the expected cost to the insurer of ceding a fraction τ of the losses to the reinsurer is that fraction of the expected loss l, plus the reinsurer's capital cost, plus his information acquisition cost, i.e., τ l −λa r τ SD [δ |i r ]−c (v/v r − 1)−k. The benet is again a reduction in the required amount of capital. Hence, the insurer's expected payo from ceding risk to the reinsurer is
where v r is given by (16).
A First Look at the Role of Information Redundancy
We wish to compare Γ i,f and Γ i,r for the purpose of determining the superior form of risk transfer, that yielding the highest expected payo to the insurer. There are no general results for this comparison, but in order to provide some intuition and illustrate some of the tradeos involved in the insurer's choice, we may consider the two polar cases γ = 0 and γ = 1, with k = 0 and N therefore large.
When the number of traders is large, competition erodes trading prots, and informed traders do not acquire information beyond 1/v. Nevertheless, when γ = 0, there is no aggregate uncertainty for large N . As the price in the nancial market aggregates all information, the insurer can infer from that price the exact value of δ and therefore has no need for capital, so that
In contrast, the reinsurer is able to prot from the information he acquires, and may therefore select v r < v. The payo to the insurer from using reinsurance is given by
Hence, regardless of whether the reinsurer chooses to acquire information beyond 1/v or not, the insurer's payo from using reinsurance is lower than that from using the nancial market. Thus, as in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , when the correlated error term disappears (γ = 0), the nancial market reveals the information about δ very precisely, and public nancing dominates private nancing (reinsurance in our case).
On the other hand, when γ = 1, aggregate uncertainty in the nancial market remains even for large N . Since no trader acquires information beyond 1/v, the insurer's payo from using the nancial market is
The expected payo from using reinsurance does not depend on γ, and is therefore still given by (20) . Note that since the reinsurer's incentive to acquire information is smaller than the rst-best level, any information the reinsurer acquires is worth more than its cost from the insurer's point of view. Thus, the insurer's prot from using reinsurance is bounded from below by (20) with v r = v, i.e., one has
Thus, when γ = 1, two opposing eects operate. On the one hand, the (potentially) higher quality of the information in the case of reinsurance favors reinsurance over the nancial market. On the other hand, the zero net cost of capital of the nancial market favors the nancial market over reinsurance. Which eect dominates determines the optimal form of risk transfer. It is interesting to contrast these results with those of Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . In their model, when costly information is perfectly correlated across agents, private nancing (reinsurance in our case) is always used because it avoids the duplication of eort in information production that arises in the nancial market. In our setting, the nancial market may nevertheless be used because of its lower cost of capital.
Determinants of the Preferred Form of Risk Transfer
In order to gain greater insights into how the dierent parameters aect the preferred form of risk transfer, we solve the model numerically, computing the insurer's expected payo from transferring risk both to the nancial market and to the reinsurer. The payo from transferring risk to the nancial market is obtained by rst determining the optimal amount of information acquisition by each informed trader, v, using the rst-order condition (10), taking the number of traders N as given. The equilibrium number of traders is then determined as the largest value of N for which the traders' expected prot (11), given their optimal information acquisition strategy v, is nonnegative. Finally, given N and v, the insurer's payo is computed using (17). Similarly, the insurer's payo from transferring risk to the reinsurer is obtained by rst determining the reinsurer's optimal information acquisition strategy v r using (16). The insurer's payo is then obtained by inserting the optimal v r into (18). transfer, we solve the model for parameter values computed from information obtained from Swiss Re. We view these values as loosely representing current assessment of the distribution of losses and the information about such losses for a natural catastrophe event.
The values are (m denotes millions): l = −500m, √ v δ = 1, 600m, √ v = 1, 000m, τ = 0.5, a r = 0.05, k = 5m, and c = 6m. To help interpret the parameter c that indexes the variable cost of acquiring information, note that a value of 6m implies that the variable cost of halving the standard deviation of the error in the information from
We set λ = 2.5, implying that the insurer and the reinsurer hold enough capital to cover losses with a probability of slightly over 99%. Using the results of Fama and French (1997) , we set a i = 0.06. 22 Finally, reecting the lack of trading in catastrophe derivatives, we set √ v z = 1m: liquidity traders' demand has standard deviation equal to 0.2% of expected loss.
Thus, in our base case, losses associated with catastrophes are large and highly uncertain; the xed and variable costs of acquiring information are high; the standard deviation of liquidity trader demand is low; and acquiring information at the level 1/v permits a near halving of the uncertainty about losses.
The results of our base case are shown in Figure 1 , which presents the model's solution as a function of the degree of information redundancy, γ. Specically, the six panels in the gure report (1) the number of informed traders, N , (2) The reason is that the nancial market's capital cost advantage is not sucient to oset its information cost disadvantage. The large information cost disadvantage arises from the combination of the large xed information acquisition cost of 5m and the large number of traders (between 15 and 30 depending on γ) that choose to become informed in the nancial market, resulting in total information acquisition costs of about 150m (versus about 10m
for reinsurance). The nancial market's capital cost advantage ranges from about 50m for γ = 0 to about 20m for γ = 1. It represents the net impact of two eects. First, the capital cost for the fraction of risk transferred is zero for the nancial market and a r for reinsurance; this rst eect unambiguously favors the nancial market. Second, the quality of the information produced aects the amount of costly capital that the insurer must hold.
Although the reinsurer acquires more precise information than individual informed traders in the nancial market, for γ < 0.5, information acquisition by multiple traders yields better quality information than reinsurance, allowing the insurer to hold less capital than he would with reinsurance. When the degree of redundancy in the information produced is large (γ > 0.5), the opposite holds.
It is instructive to consider the impact of the degree of information redundancy γ.
Although γ does not aect the reinsurer's information acquisition strategy and the cost of using reinsurance (see Section 1), it does aect information production in the nancial market and the cost of using it. The results in Figure 1 show that as γ increases, the number of traders decreases (because expected prot per trader falls), but the quality of the information produced by each trader increases. Overall, an increase in γ causes total information acquisition costs to rise, but the quality of the information available to the insurer to deteriorate. This causes reinsurance to dominate more strongly, the larger γ.
Summarizing, Figure 1 shows that when the xed information acquisition cost k is large, reinsurance is preferred because the insurer would pay for this cost multiple times if he selected the nancial market. For low γ, the nancial market does produce better information than reinsurance, but it is subject to a Hirshleifer eect in the sense that the extra information produced is not worth its cost. When the degree of redundancy in the information is large, however, the nancial market is unable to produce better quality information than the reinsurer, in spite of the larger information acquisition coststhe reinsurer's information production is much more ecient because it avoids duplication.
What would it take for the nancial market to dominate reinsurance? From the above discussion, one factor that could help is a lower xed cost of information acquisition, k.
Granted, a lower k would increase the number of informed traders, but it may decrease the product N k. Figure 2 shows the solution of the model for k = 0.1m (for each of the settings considered in the remainder of this section, all parameter values that are not mentioned explicitly are the same as in the base case). 23 Observe that for γ < 0.75, the number of informed traders in the nancial market is much larger than previously at about 400, and the nancial market dominates reinsurance. Two factors contribute to this eect.
First, although total information acquisition costs are still higher for the nancial market than for reinsurance, the nancial market's information cost disadvantage is much smaller than in Figure 1 at about 30m. Second, because the larger number of traders provides for better quality information, the nancial market's capital cost advantage is higher than in the base case, ranging from 70m for γ = 0 to 30m for γ = 0.75. Observe also that for γ < 0.6, the nancial market provides better information than reinsurance. In contrast to the situation in Figure 1 , however, the extra information is worth the extra cost because of the low k.
The situation when γ > 0.75 is very dierent: informed traders acquire information beyond 1/v, the number of informed traders falls sharply, and the performance of the nancial market deteriorates signicantly. The reason is that although not very valuable because redundant, information beyond 1/v is very costly to acquire: when k is much lower than c, it is cheaper to have numerous people buy imprecise information than have few people acquire precise information. However, when γ > 0.75, the nancial market produces the second outcome. This makes the use of the nancial market prohibitively costly. Granted, the reinsurer acquires higher quality information than does an individual trader in the nancial market, at a higher cost. However, that cost is incurred only once reinsurance avoids the duplication in information production that plagues the nancial market for large γ because of the large variable cost c. Figure 2 considered a situation where the xed cost k was much smaller than the variable cost c. Figure 3 shows the model's solution for the opposite situation, with c = 0.12m and k = 5m. In this setting, the cost structure is such that it is much more ecient for a single agent to acquire very precise information than for numerous agents to pay the xed cost k and acquire relatively imprecise information. Reecting this fact, reinsurance provides better information than the nancial market for all γ, at a much lower cost. The information provided by reinsurance is more precise than that provided by the nancial market to such an extent that reinsurance also has a capital cost advantage over the nancial market (despite the reinsurer's positive cost of capital a r ). Thus, for low c and large k, reinsurance strongly dominates the nancial market for all γ.
The intuition that the ratio c/k constitutes a key determinant of the preferred form of risk transfer is conrmed in Figure 4 , which considers the situation where both c and k are 50 times smaller than in the base case, i.e., setting c = 0.12 and k = 0.1. Note that except for very low values of γ, the quality of the information provided by reinsurance exceeds that provided by the nancial market. Furthermore, and as in Figure 1 , the total information acquisition cost is much higher for the nancial market than for reinsurance.
As a result, and as in the base case, reinsurance dominates the nancial market for all γ.
The implication of Figures 24 is that two characteristics of information production favor the nancial market over reinsurance: highly convex information production costs (in our context, variable costs c that exceed xed costs k), and low redundancy in information production γ. The rst makes it cost-ecient to divide information acquisition among many agents; the second ensures that duplication in information production is not a concern. The importance of information redundancy and information acquisition costs for the choice between public and private nancing has already been analyzed by Subrah-manyam and Titman (1999) . What our analysis reveals is that in addition to the level of information acquisition costs, their convexity is critical for this decision. The consequence is that technological innovations in information production that aect xed and variable information production costs dierently impact the preferred form of risk transfer: innovations that reduce xed costs favor the nancial market, while innovations that reduce variable costs favor reinsurance.
There is a widespread view that the presence of numerous hedgers and liquidity traders supports the use and development of nancial markets. 24 In order to determine whether this is indeed the case, consider the eect of increasing the volatility of liquidity trader demand to √ v z = 5, ve times its initial value, while keeping all other parameters as in the base case. The results are reported in Figure 5 . The increased presence of liquidity traders stimulates both the number of informed traders in the nancial market and the quality of the information that each trader acquires to such an extent that the quality of the information reected in the price exceeds that provided by reinsurance regardless of the degree of information redundancy. Interestingly, for γ > 0.6, each trader even acquires more precise information than the reinsurer. Although the increased information acquisition in the nancial market is favorable from a capital cost perspective, the cost of the information produced is prohibitively large at about 500m, illustrating the Hirshleifer eect in a very stark way. Thus, rather than making the nancial market perform better, the presence of numerous hedgers and liquidity traders causes reinsurance to be preferred. The implication is that in order for risk transfer through the nancial market to be advantageous, it may be necessary to restrict rather than encourage the participation of liquidity traders in these markets. Limited liquidity trader participation may account for the relative success of o-exchange, privately placed catastrophe bonds mentioned in the introduction.
What does it take for the nancial market to dominate reinsurance when the variability of hedging demand is large? The preceding analysis suggests that a very low xed cost k may achieve this result, and Figure 6 , which uses √ v z = 5 and k = 0.001m, reveals that this is indeed the case. Observe that the nancial market dominates reinsurance for 24 See for example Cuny (1993) . γ < 0.4, i.e., for values of γ for which the number of traders is extremely large at almost 30,000, but none of the traders acquires information beyond 1/v. In spite of the fact that no trader acquires information beyond 1/v, for low γ, the large number of traders makes the information contained in the price extremely precise. This reduces the capital cost of using the nancial market below that of using reinsurance. As soon as individual traders begin acquiring information beyond 1/v, however, total information acquisition costs in the nancial market become prohibitively large, and reinsurance is preferred. Thus, the picture that emerges from Figure 6 is that when hedging demand is highly variable, the nancial market dominates only if both the xed cost of information acquisition and the degree of information redundancy are smallthese are the same factors that were identied in Figures 24, but the required values become more extreme, the larger √ v z . We view the present case as representative of share and bond markets for low γ.
The preceding analysis reveals that low liquidity trading favors the nancial market because it limits informed traders' ability to prot from the information they acquire, reducing the severity of the Hirshleifer eect. Intuitively, one could expect the same eect to arise if the prior uncertainty about the loss, √ v δ , is small. Figure 7 , which shows the solution of the model when the uncertainty about the loss is reduced to √ v δ = 250, conrms this intuition. Limited gain opportunities from trading attract fewer informed traders in the nancial market, signicantly reducing its information cost disadvantage compared to the base case. At the same time, reecting the fact that when the uncertainty about the loss is small, there is little gain from reducing it, the reinsurer does not acquire information beyond 1/v. Although the insurer's payo improves both for the nancial market and for reinsurance compared to the base case, the nancial market's performance improvement is stronger. Thus, paradoxically, phenomena that lead to an increase in loss uncertainty, such a global warming, may constitute an opportunity rather than a threat for reinsurance companies.
Note that the small initial uncertainty about the loss causes the payo from using the nancial market in Figure 7 to be increasing in γ. The reason is that as γ increases, the fall in the number of traders produces savings in information acquisition costs that signicantly exceed the modest increase in capital cost caused by the deterioration in information qualitywhen √ v δ is low, the insurer does not need to hold much capital anyway. 25
Contrasting Figures 1 and 2 revealed that a low xed cost of information acquisition k favors the nancial market. Since k is the cost of obtaining information of precision 1/v, one could expect a lower v to favor the nancial market as well. Figure 8 , which shows the model's solution for √ v = 200, reveals that this is not the case. The intuition for this result is quite simple: when v is small, information acquisition by a single agent produces a relatively precise estimate of the value of the loss. It is therefore not worth paying the cost k multiple times (the outcome in the nancial market), and reinsurance dominates.
Note that in spite of its lower information acquisition costs, in the situation considered in Figure 8 , reinsurance provides signicantly better information than the nancial market:
liquidity trading garbles the information conveyed by the price in the nancial market. As a result, reinsurance's capital cost disadvantage is tiny. Figure 9 reports the model's solution when the fraction of risk ceded is increased to τ = 0.8. As expected, a higher τ stimulates information acquisition both for the nancial market and for reinsurance. Interestingly, the increase in the information produced in the nancial market occurs both through the number of traders (which, for low γ, increases from about 30 in the base case to over 45 here) and through the precision of the information that each trader acquires. The overall impact of the increased information acquisition is a sizable widening of the nancial market's information cost disadvantage to over 200m, with the consequence that reinsurance dominates even more clearly than in the base case.
For instance, for γ = 0, the insurer is about 140m better o using reinsurance than using the nancial market, versus about 90m in the base case. For γ = 1, the payo dierential has widened from about 130m to about 190m.
How does the insurer's capital cost a i aect the preferred form of risk transfer? Obviously, an increase in a i has no eect on the quality of the information produced by the nancial market and by the reinsurer. However, a larger a i makes economizing on costly capital more important and therefore favors the form of risk transfer that provides better quality information. This eect is apparent in Figure 10 , which shows the model's solution for a i = 0.2. Although information production and the nancial market's information cost disadvantage are the same as in the base case, the nancial market's capital cost advantage diers. For γ < 0.5, the nancial market provides better information than reinsurance, and the capital cost advantage is larger than in the base case. In contrast, for γ > 0.5, reinsurance provides better information than the nancial market, and the capital cost advantage is much smaller than in the base casefor γ = 1, it even vanishes. Thus, in this example, although reinsurance still dominates for all γ, the nancial market performs better than in the base case for γ < 0.5 and worse for γ > 0.5.
Durbin (2001) and Froot (2001) suggest that a prior catastrophe that depletes the capital of the reinsurance industry and increases the reinsurer's capital cost a r tends to favor the nancial market. Figure 11 , which shows the model's solution for a r = 0.3, reveals that this is indeed the case. Observe that the nancial market dominates for low γ, but that reinsurance still dominates for large γ. A higher a r causes the nancial market to perform better for two reasons. The rst, obvious one is that the nancial market's capital cost advantage increases. The second reason is that in an attempt to keep the amount of capital under control, the reinsurer reacts to the increased capital cost by acquiring very precise informationin the example in Figure 11 , the reinsurer spends over 50m in information acquisition costs. This signicantly reduces the nancial market's information cost disadvantage.
A prior catastrophe also depletes the capital of primary insurers. Figure 12 shows the model's solution if, following a catastrophe, both the insurer's and the reinsurer's capital cost increase signicantly to a i = 0.36 and a r = 0.3, respectively, six times their value in the base case. Observe that although it still performs better than in the base case, the nancial market does not do as well as in Figure 11 . In particular, it does not dominate reinsurance for low γ. The reason is that, as was shown in Figure 10 , a large a i tends to favor the form of risk transfer that produces better quality information: the insurer benets from the extremely precise information acquired by the reinsurer, which reduces reinsurance's capital cost disadvantage compared to the nancial market.
Finally, observe that an increase in the stringency of capital requirements λ has the same impact as a proportionate increase in both a i and a r . For example, increasing λ from its base case value of 2.5 to 15 while leaving a i and a r at their base case values of 0.06 and 0.05, respectively, has exactly the same eect as leaving λ = 2.5 and setting a i = 0.3 and a r = 0.36, the situation considered in Figure 12 . The fact that the nancial market performs comparatively better than in the base case for low γ and worse for large γ can be understood as follows. More stringent capital requirements have no eect on information production in the nancial market, but stimulate information acquisition by the reinsurer.
This reduces the nancial market's information cost disadvantage. At the same time, a higher λ increases capital costs both for the nancial market and for reinsurance. For each form of risk transfer, the increase is smaller, the better the quality of the information provided. For reinsurance, where the quality of information is independent of γ, this translates into a constant increase in the capital cost. For the nancial market, where the quality of the information is decreasing in γ, the increase in the capital cost is more pronounced, the larger γ. For instance, in the example considered in Figure 12 , reinsurance's capital cost increases to about 260m, compared to 70m in the base case. For the nancial market, the capital cost increases from about 30m to 170m for γ = 0, and from about 50m to about 310m for γ = 1almost twice as much. The consequence is that for γ = 0, the nancial market's capital cost advantage has widened compared to the base case, while for γ = 1, it has turned into a capital cost disadvantage.
Summarizing, the numerical analysis in this section shows that large xed information acquisition costs k, large redundancy in the information produced γ, large volatility of liquidity trading √ v z , large prior uncertainty about the loss √ v δ , and a large fraction of risk ceded τ tend to favor reinsurance. In contrast, a large variable cost of information acquisition c, large noise in the information acquired √ v, and a large reinsurer cost of capital a r tend to favor the nancial market. An increase in the insurer's cost of capital a i favors the form of risk transfer that produces the most precise information. Finally, more stringent capital requirements λ have the same eect as a proportionate increase in a i and a r ; they tend to favor the nancial market for low γ and reinsurance for large γ.
Conclusion
In this study, we use dierences in information gathering incentives between nancial markets and reinsurance companies to explain why nancial markets have not displaced reinsurance as the primary risk-sharing vehicle for natural catastrophe risk, despite reinsurance's alleged ineciency. We consider an insurance company that seeks to transfer a fraction of its natural catastrophe risk exposure either through the nancial market or through traditional reinsurance. Analyzing the optimal information acquisition policy of informed traders and the reinsurer, we nd that the nancial market may display a Hirshleifer (1971) eect in the sense that the supply of information by informed traders is excessive relative to its value for the insurance company. Since the cost of the information produced ultimately is borne by the insurer, he favors reinsurance over the nancial market.
Whether traditional reinsurance or the nancial market is ultimately selected depends crucially on the information acquisition cost structure and on the degree of redundancy in the information produced. When xed information acquisition costs are large, it is very costly to have several traders in the nancial market acquire information, and reinsurance is preferred. When information acquisition costs are highly convex, however, decentralized information production is more ecient, and the nancial market is preferred. When the degree of redundancy in the information is large, there is little value to the insurer in having several traders acquire information, and reinsurance is preferred. Conversely, when the degree of redundancy is small, having several traders acquire information is very valuable because it allows reducing residual risk drastically, and the nancial market is preferred.
A further prediction of the model is that factors that limit informed traders' ability to protably take advantage of their informationsuch as the presence of few liquidity traders onlyshould make the use of the nancial market more likely. The limited extent of liquidity trading in private markets may therefore provide an explanation for the relative success of the private placement of securitized natural catastrophe risks among insurance companies, hedge funds and other institutional players. In contrast, factors that stimulate information acquisition by informed traders should favor reinsurance. One such factor is an increase in the uncertainty about losses. Thus, paradoxically, global warming and its detrimental impact on loss uncertainty may represent an opportunity for reinsurance companies, unless the nancial market's expertise in modeling natural catastrophe risks improves.
This study could be extended along several dimensions. First, one could allow the insurer to use both reinsurance and the nancial market. Second, one could explicitly account for the moral hazard issues that prevail in the reinsurance industry in order to assess whether the magnitude of the associated costs would be sucient to reverse the conclusion that reinsurance tends to dominate the nancial market. Third, one could construct a dynamic version of the model incorporating the learning process that takes place in the nancial market and in the reinsurance industry in order to assess whether greater familiarity with the assessment of catastrophe risks could, over time, make the use of the nancial market more viable. Finally, one could investigate whether there are dierences in the degree of information redundancy across the various types of natural catastrophes earthquakes, oods, hurricanes, windstormsin order to assess whether some of these risks are more amenable to securitization and successful exchange trading than others.
Determination of Expected Prot Π f
From (29), given v n = v, the trader's expected prot is given by
Using (8) and (9), the rst term can be rewritten as
Inserting this expression into (36) 
